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Abstract. In this paper, we will present an estimate of the intensity of competition in the 
different branches of the Moroccan industrial sector, in order to identify the branches that 
will be the subject of pro-competitive structural reforms, with the aim of strengthening the 
economic activity and job creation. For each industry, the intensity of competition is 
evaluated using the estimated margin factor (or markup) estimated from the method 
proposed by Roeger (1995). The econometric results obtained show that the relatively high 
margin factor in the "agrifood" and "chemical and parachemical" branches suggests that 
these industries are not very competitive over the 1985-2015 period.  On the other hand, the 
branches of "mechanical, metallic and electrical" and "extractive" industries that have 
significantly lower markup rates compared to other industries appear to be more 
competitive. The estimate of margin factors over different periods will allow us to assess 
the evolution over time of the degree of competition in each of the branches studied. Thus, 
the estimate of markup rates during the period 1985-1999 remains unclear (the margin 
factor is significantly lower than 1), hence we need additional information to determine the 
degree of concentration of industrial branches. For the period 2000-2015, the "extractive", 
"chemical and parachemical" and "agro-food" branches are less competitive, while the 
"mechanical, metal and electrical" industries appear to be more competitive. 
Keywords. Morocco, Industrial sector, Industrial branches, Markup, Competition. 
JEL. L22, L25, L60, L71, O14. 
 
1. Introduction 
his study aims to estimate the intensity of the competition of the various 
branches of Moroccan industry, to determine the branches to be the subject 
of pro-competitive structural reforms likely to promote economic growth 
and job creation. Competition in the goods and services markets is often cited as a 
factor of economic growth. Increasing competition in a sector would indeed 
increase activity and employment by lowering the selling price of products but also 
by improving the productivity of the sector, particularly through innovation (Klein, 
& Romain, 2009). 
From a theoretical point of view, however, the effect of competition on 
productivity is ambiguous. The fear of losing market shares and disappearing must 
certainly encourage companies to innovate, but it is also possible that firms are 
only willing to bear the costs of innovation if they receive in return sufficiently 
high annuities (Klein, & Romain, 2009). 
For each industry, the intensity of competition is assessed using the markup 
margin, which fairly accurately reflects the effective competitive intensity of the 
sectors. It is defined as the ratio between the selling price and the cost of 
production of an additional unit of product (the marginal cost).1 
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A higher margin factor corresponds to a lower degree of competition (Martins, 
Scarpetta, & Pilat, 1996; Przybyla, & Roma, 2005). The estimate of margin factors 
over different periods also makes it possible to assess the evolution over time of the 
degree of competition in each of the sectors. The econometric estimate of the 
margin factors is based on the method developed by Roeger (1995), used in 
particular by the OECD and the ECB (Martins, Scarpetta, & Pilat, 1996; Przybyla, 
& Roma, 2005). 
The markup is related to the Lerner index denoted B by the expression μ = 1 / 
(1-B). In pure and perfect competition (μ = 1, B = 0), the Solow residual is 
independent of the growth rate of the capital/labor ratio and is equal to the rate of 
technical progress. The econometric results obtained from the markups estimate of 
the seven Moroccan industrial branches show that at the overall level the test is 
statistically significant for only four branches that have a positive Lerner index, 
which reflects the existence of a power without being able to determine the scale. 
The relatively high margin factor in the "agri-food" and "chemical and 
parachemical" industries (1.42) suggests that these industries are not very 
competitive during the 1985-2015 period. On the other hand, the "mechanical, 
metallic and electrical" and "extractive" branches, which have significantly lower 
markup rates, respectively (1.25) and (1.28), appear to be relatively more 
competitive than "other non-manufacturing industries excluding oil refining"(1.32) 
and "oil refining" (1.34). 
In addition, the estimate of the margin factors over different periods makes it 
possible to assess the evolution over time of the degree of competition in each of 
the branches studied since the mid-1980s. The sub-period analysis shows that 
during the period 1985-1999 the margin factor estimate remains unclear (the 
margin factor is significantly lower than 1), hence we need additional information 
to determine the level of industrial branches’ concentration. As far as the oil 
refining industry, the results show that firms have the ability to influence prices in 
the market, reflecting the low level of competition in this activity. For the period 
2000-2015, the relatively high margin factor in the "extractive" (2), "chemical and 
parachemical" (1.71) and "agrifood" (1.47) industries means that these branches are 
less competitive with other industries. 
However, the "mechanical, metallic and electrical" branch, which has a 
significantly lower markup rate compared to other branches (1.28), appears to be 
more competitive than "other manufacturing industries excluding oil refining" 
(1.36) and "oil refining" (1.32). With regard to the textile and leather industries, the 
results obtained, both for the overall period and in sub-periods, show a situation 
where the selling price is lower than the marginal cost, in a situation marked by the 
absence of market power. (existence of competition), which means that one faces 
either a practice of unfair competition, namely "dumping", or a situation of tax 
evasion. 
 
2. Theory and literature 
2.1. The reform of the competition law in Morocco 
Morocco, which has an advanced status in its relations with the European 
Union, has for years been engaged in a process of regulatory convergence, 
particularly in the area of competition law. 
The legal framework, which aimed at promoting healthy competition and 
consumer protection, was reinforced by Law No. 06-99 on freedom of prices and 
competition, which intervened to repeal the Act of 12 October 1971 on the 
regulation and control of prices, as well as by other rules to complete the 
institutional building (Law 17-97 on the protection of industrial property, Dahir on 
obligations and contracts, Trade Law, etc). 
However, under this mechanism, the Competition Council was merely a 
consultative body, devoid of decision-making power or sanction, while the Head of 
Government had wide powers, ranging from the authorization of operations to 
impede the free competition until the appeals to the King's Prosecutor, with a view 
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to instituting proceedings in the case of anti-competitive agreements between 
market operators or abuse of dominant position. 
With the promulgation of Morocco’s new Constitution in 2011, the Competition 
Council was strengthened its status, establishing itself as an "independent 
administrative body responsible for ensuring transparency and equity in economic 
relations", thus marking an overhaul of the competition law in Morocco. This 
development was confirmed by the publication of two laws on August 7, 2014. It is 
the law no.104-12 on freedom of prices and competition and the law no.20-13 on 
the Competition Council, which came to devote the tasks of the Competition 
Council and to make it a veritable regulator of competition in Morocco. In this 
context, cases of referral to the Competition Council have been expanded, insofar 
as the Competition Council, as an independent administrative institution, has new 
powers of self-referral, control, sanction and decision-making, which should 
improve the conditions of the economic relations that are forming in the Kingdom. 
 
2.2. Review of empirical studies on the estimation of the competition-
productivity relationship 
Several studies have dealt with estimating the competitive intensity of economic 
sectors and the relationship between competition and productivity grains. Thus, we 
will try to expose some works that constituted the frame of reference of our study. 
This is a study of the Directorate of Studies and Financial Forecasts (DEPF) on 
"the freight transport sector: constraints and ways of reform", carried out in 2013, 
which reveals that the mining industry shows the highest markup (2.84), while the 
transport markup (1.33) was close to the trade mark (1.31) because of the similarity 
of their structure. 
It also considers that a drop in the markup in the transport sector generates an 
increase in GDP, employment and final consumption of households. 
Another study by Abbad (2017) on "the accumulation of capital and 
productivity gains in Morocco", published in 2017 by the OCP Policy Center, 
presents a change in the margin rate2 of Moroccan companies during the period 
2000-2014. Morocco's margin3 rate improved significantly between the two sub-
periods, from 62.3% on average between 2000 and 2007 to 64% on average 
between 2008 and 2014, a gain of 1.7 points. This rate stabilized at a maximum 
level between 2008 and 2010 (64.9%) before falling gradually to 63.6% in 2013 
and 62.2% in 2014. 
Another working paper by Bouis (2007) of the Directorate General of Treasury 
and Economic Policy (DGTPE) in 2007, entitled "Which sectors to reform to 
promote employment and growth", proposes an estimate and a comparison of the 
intensity of competition from different sectors in France compared to a group of 
European countries (Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy). The study 
reveals that three sectors of the French economy seem to be subject to relatively 
weak competition. These are retail trade, hotels and financial intermediation. An 
increase in competition in these sectors, leading to markup levels close to those 
observed in the most competitive countries, would eventually increase the value 
added of the market branches by 1.2% and the creation of around 200,000 jobs. 
"Competition and productivity gains: sector analysis in OECD countries" is the 
title of a study conducted by Klein & Bouis (2009), which examines the estimation 
of the relationship between the intensity of competition and productivity gains 
from a sample of 11 OECD countries and some 20 sectors over the period 1981-
2004. The results indicate, in particular, that competition would be favorable to 
productivity gains up to a certain level but unfavorable beyond that, and that 
increased competition would increase productivity in less competitive sectors but 
would have no effect on the less competitive sectors more competitive. 
Another study on "Competition, Productivity and Efficiency", conducted by 
Pilat (1996), which attempts to examine some of the empirical results on 
productivity gaps between OECD countries, to analyze the relationship between 
productivity and competition and to determine factors, including the conditions of 
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competition, that contribute to low productivity or the existence of inefficient 
behavior. According to this work, it appears that the differences between OECD 
countries in the level and rate of productivity growth appear to be related to a 
certain extent to the degree of competition facing industries and sectors in the 
different countries. 
 
3. Data set and method  
In this part, we will present the research methodology and the evaluation of the 
results of our econometric modeling. 
 
3.1. Methodology 
The markup or margin factor (= 1 + margin rate) is estimated, for each sector, 
from the method proposed by Roeger (1995) and explained in the appendix. It is a 
question of reversing the rate of growth of the production in value, not explained 
by the growth of the factors in value, on the rate of growth of the nominal 
productivity of the capital. The coefficient estimated in the regressions is the 
Lerner index, defined by the ratio (price - marginal cost)/price. It makes it possible 
to obtain the markup by the relation markup = 1/ (1 - index of Lerner). 
The markups estimated in the context of our work correspond to markups on 
production (ratio of price to marginal cost of production). The markup is related to 
the Lerner index denoted B by the expression μ 𝜇 = 1 (1 − 𝛽) .  Solow's residue is 
rewritten 
 
      𝑆𝑅 = ∆𝑞 − 𝛼∆𝐼 −  1 − 𝛼 ∆𝑘 = 𝛽 ∆𝑞 − ∆𝑘 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜃 
 
In pure and perfect competition (B = 0), the Solow residue is equal to the rate of 
technical progress. Roeger (1995) shows that an equivalent expression can be 
obtained for a Solow residue based on the prices 
 
𝑆𝑅𝑃 = 𝛼∆𝑤 +  1 − 𝛼 ∆𝑟 − ∆𝑝 = −𝛽 ∆𝑝 − ∆𝑟 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜃 
 
Subtracting SRP from SR and adding an error term yields an expression to 
estimate B 
 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽∆𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
or   
 
∆𝑦 =  ∆𝑞 + ∆𝑝 − 𝛼 ∆𝐼 + ∆𝑤 −  1 − 𝛼  ∆𝑘 + ∆𝑟 , 
 
is the growth rate of nominal Solow residue and 
 
∆𝑥 =  ∆𝑞 + ∆𝑝 −  ∆𝑘 + ∆𝑟 , 
 
is the growth rate of the nominal production-to-capital ratio. The advantage of 
this method is that prices and volumes can be grouped so that only nominal 
variables are needed for the estimation. 
It is possible to extend the approach by incorporating intermediate consumption. 
In this case, the markup is defined as the ratio between the marginal cost and the 
production price, and no longer the price of value added. Dependent variable and 
explanatory variables become 
 
∆𝑦𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 =  ∆𝑞𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 + ∆𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 − 𝛼𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 ∆𝐼 + ∆𝑤 − 𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑  ∆𝑛 + ∆𝑝𝑐𝑖 
−  1 − 𝛼𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 − 𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑  ∆𝑘 + ∆𝑟 , 
              ∆𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 =  ∆𝑞𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 + ∆𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 −  ∆𝑘 + ∆𝑟 , 
or 
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qprod = log (production), 
pprod = log (production deflator), 
αprod = share of employment in production, 
l = log (job), 
w = log (salary), 
n = log (intermediate consumption), 
pci = log (price of intermediate consumption), 
βprod = share of intermediate consumption in production, 
k = log (capital stock), 
r = log (cost of capital). 
It should be recalled that markup estimates are obtained under the assumption of 
constant returns to scale. Taking into account increasing returns to scale would lead 
to even larger estimated markups. (on this point, see for example Hylleberg & 
Jorgensen, 1998). 
The data needed to estimate the margin factors are available for all Moroccan 
industrial branches, through the HCP statistics, and the results of the annual 
surveys of the processing industries of the Moroccan Observatory of Industry, 
under the Ministry of Industry, Trade, Investment and Digital Economy, as well as 
published industry indicators. However, the cost of capital variable4 is not available 
and is difficult to estimate due to the lack of data on capital stock in the industrial 
sector in Morocco. We thus opted for the industry-wide industrial price index 
variable as a proxy variable. The estimation method used is ordinary least squares 
(OLS). 
 
4. Finding  
The econometric results obtained from the markups estimate of the seven 
Moroccan industrial branches show that at the overall level the test is statistically 
significant for only four branches that have a positive Lerner index, which reflects 
the existence of a market power without being able to determine the scale. 
 
Table 1. Total Period 1985-2015 
Results of the Markups estimate  B sig markup sig 
Secteurs 
 
Global 0,161 0,319 1,19220928 Non significatif 
Extractive Indu 0,222 0,804 1,2858361 Non significatif 
Agro Indu 0,299 0 1,42711545* Signaficatif 
Chemical and parachemical  Indu  0,298 0,283 1,42551279 Non significatif 
Mechanical, metallic and electrical Indu 0,202 0,07 1,25260555 Signaficatif 
Textile and leather  Indu -0,485 0,203 0,67322596 Non significatif 
Other manufacturing Ind excluding 
refining 
0,248 0 1,32917896 Signaficatif 
Oil refining 0,256 0 1,34450043 Signaficatif 
     Note: (*) The confidence interval of the margin factors of the industrial branches over the 1985-2015 
period is estimated at the 10% threshold. 
Source: Authors calculations based on HCP data. 
 
These are the "agro-food", "mechanical, metal and electrical", "other 
manufacturing industries excluding oil refining" and "oil refining" industries where 
firms have the ability to influence prices in the market, but cannot determine the 
extent of that power. It should be noted that there is more market power in 
"chemical and parachemical" than "extractive" industries, because the B coefficient 
of the chemical branch is higher than that of the extractive industries and is thus the 
closest to 1. For the textile and leather industries, the test is statistically 
insignificant with a negative B coefficient, which means that this situation is 
unlikely to occur because B ε [0,1) is below the profit maximization. 
On the other hand, the relatively high margin factor in the agri-food and 
chemical and parachemical industries (1.42) suggests that these industries are not 
very competitive during the 1985-2015 period. In Addition, the "mechanical, metal 
and electrical" and "extractive" branches, which have significantly lower markup 
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rates, respectively (1.25) and (1.28), appear to be relatively more competitive than 
"other manufacturing industries excluding oil refining "(1.32) and" oil refining 
"(1.34) during this period. 
In this context, estimating margin factors over different periods will allow us to 
evaluate the evolution over time of the degree of competition in each of the 
branches studied since the mid-1980s. In this respect, we divide our database into 
two. A choice that seems perfectly justified, given the restructuring experienced by 
the industrial sector, thanks to the launch of several plans from the 2000s aimed at 
promoting the emergence and industrial acceleration of Morocco. It is thus 
necessary to estimate the margin factors of the industrial branches during the 
periods 1985-1999 and 2000-2015, in order to evaluate its degree of evolution and 
thus the impact of the reforms undertaken and the plans launched on the 
competitive intensity in Moroccan industry. 
 
Table 2. Results of the 1985-1999 sub-period 
Years Branches B sig markup Sig 
1985-1999 
Extractive Indu -16,284 0,027 0,05785654* Significant 
Agro Indu  -0,82 0,043 0,54956281 Significant 
Chemical and parachemical Indu  -4,234 0,012 0,1910436 Significant 
Mechanical, metallic and electrical Indu -1,356 0,086 0,42438866 Significant 
Textile and leather Indu -2,044 0,217 0,32846306 Non Significant 
Other manufacturing Indu excluding refining   -0,088 0,527 0,9193545 Non Significant 
Oil Refining 1,339 0,049 -2,94689618 Significant 
Note: (*) The confidence interval of the margin factors of the industrial branches over the 1985-2015 
period is estimated at the 10% threshold. 
Source: Authors calculations based on HCP data. 
 
During the 1985-1999 period, the test is statistically significant for five 
branches, four of which have a negative Lerner index. These are the extractive, 
agro-food, chemical and parachemical, and mechanical, metal and electrical 
industries. 
The negative sign of the Lerner index means that no conclusion can be drawn as 
to the degree of market power that exists, as this can occur both under conditions of 
competition and non-competition which requires additional information on the 
prevailing conditions of competition in this market. Regarding the oil refining 
industry, the test reflects the existence of market power, but its degree cannot be 
determined. For the textile and leather industries, and other manufacturing 
industries excluding oil refining, the test reveals that this situation is unlikely to 
occur because B ε [0,1) is below profit maximization. 
We would like to remind you that in our analysis Morocco’s orientations of the 
industrial policies we could note that the industrial development during the 80's 
and 90's remained based on the downstream transformation and the assembly, the 
valorization of the natural resources, in particular phosphates, and the 
encouragement of exports to alleviate the deficit of the trade balance. This explains 
the insignificant markup rates (<1) obtained, which do not allow us to determine 
the degree of competitive intensity of industrial branches during this period. 
 
Table 3. Results of the 1985-1999 sub-period 
Years Branches B sig markup Sig 
2000-2015 
Extractive Indu 0,502 0,12 2,00653947 Non Significant 
Agro Indu  0,323 0 1,47733406 Significant 
Chemical and parachemical Indu  0,416 0,186 1,71366428 Non Significant 
Mechanical, metallic and electrical Indu 0,219 0,091 1,28107819 Significant 
Textile and leather Indu -0,568 0,273 0,63774571 Non Significant 
Other manufacturing Indu excluding refining   0,269 0 1,36831664 Significant 
Oil Refining 0,248 0,002 1,3291217 Significant 
Source: Authors calculations based on HCP data 
 
For the period 2000-2015, the test is statistically significant for the "agri-food", 
"mechanical, metallic and electrical", "other non-refining manufacturing" and 
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"petroleum refining" branches with a positive Lerner index which refers to the 
existence of market power, without being able to determine its extent. For 
companies operating in the extractive industries and chemical and parachemical 
industries, the results show that during this period they hold market power, with 
more power in the extractive sector. For its part, the extractive sector is less 
competitive, because of the significant weight of the phosphate industry, whose 
production is monopolized by the Office Chérifien des Phosphates (OCP). 
For the textile and leather industries, the test is statistically insignificant with a 
negative B coefficient, a situation that is unlikely to occur because B ε [0,1) is 
below profit maximization. This situation means that the selling price is lower than 
the marginal cost, in a context marked by the existence of competition, which leads 
us to think that we face either a practice of unfair competition, namely "dumping", 
or a situation of tax evasion, in which costs are inflated and prices declared do not 
reflect reality. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Estimating the intensity of competition in the various branches of the Moroccan 
industrial sector during the period 1985-2015 has shown us that the relatively high 
margin factor in the "agro-food" and "chemical and parachemical" branches leads 
to think that these branches are not very competitive. 
On the other hand, the "mechanical, metal and electrical" and "extractive" 
industries with significantly lower markup rates appear relatively more competitive 
than "other non-oil refining manufacturing industries" and "oil refining". The sub-
period analysis reveals that during the period 1985-1999 the estimate of the margin 
factor remains imprecise (the margin factor is significantly lower than 1), hence we 
need additional information to determine the degree of concentration of industrial 
branches. With the exception of the oil refining industry, for which the results 
show that companies hold market power and hence the ability to influence prices in 
the market, reflecting the low level of competition in this activity. 
For the period 2000-2015, the relatively high margin factor in the "extractive" 
(2), "chemical and parachemical" (1.71) and "agrifood" (1.47) industries means 
that these branches are less competitive with other industries. However, the 
"mechanical, metallic and electrical" branch, which has a significantly lower 
markup rate compared to other branches (1.28), appears to be more competitive 
than "other manufacturing industries excluding oil refining" (1.36) and "oil 
refining" (1.32). With regard to the textile and leather industries, the results 
obtained, both for the overall period and in sub-periods, clearly show that this 
branch suffers from a lack of competitiveness, structuring and performance, due to 
the predominance of informal fabric and low value-added activities, in particular 
linked to outsourcing. 
This branch also faces a number of structural problems that prevent operating 
companies from benefiting greatly from the proximity advantage vis-à-vis the 
European markets and subsidies granted by the State to improve the 
industrialization and productivity of this sector, which is the main employer of 
Moroccan industry and one of the main pillars of the national economy. Moreover, 
during the second half of the period, the econometric estimate clearly shows that 
the effects of the restructuring of the industrial sector, while having a clear vision 
and a well-thought-out strategy, are beginning to be felt, at least they provide the 
opportunity to identify low-competitive industries that need pro-competitive 
reforms to boost competitiveness, economic growth and job creation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 4(4), S. El Ouahabi, & A. Bousselhami, p.396-407. 
403 
403 
 
Notes 
 
1 The markup rate considered here must be distinguished from the margin rate defined by the EBE / 
GVA ratio insofar as in calculating the difference between the sales price and the production costs, 
the latter already include the "normal" remuneration of capital. A high markup rate indicates 
abnormally high profits, while a high margin rate (EBE / GVA) may simply reflect a high capital 
intensity of the sector. 
2 The margin rate is defined, according to the national accounts, as the ratio between the gross 
operating surplus (corresponds to the remuneration of capital before depreciation and tax) and the 
value added. An examination of its evolution compared to that of wages makes it possible to give an 
idea of the profile of the division of the VA between the remuneration of the labor factor and the 
capital factor. 
3 A high margin rate may simply reflect a high capital intensity of the sector, while a high markup rate 
indicates abnormally high profits. 
4 The cost of capital is defined by the following formula: (nominal interest rate - expected inflation + 
decommissioning rate (= 5%)) * capital deflator. Anticipated inflation is obtained by applying an 
HP filter (parameter lambda = 100) on the GDP deflator series. 
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Appendix 
Markup estimate method 
The markup (or margin factor) is evaluated for each sector using the method developed by Roeger 
(1995), which is an extension of the Hall (1988) approach, which proposes a method for estimating 
the marginal costs of industries. The marginal cost of a firm can be expressed as follows: 
      𝐶𝑚 =
𝑊 .∆𝐿+𝑅 .∆𝐾
∆𝑄−𝜃𝑄
 
Where Q is the value added (real), W, the wage, R the cost of capital and θ the rate of technical 
progress. This expression is rewritten: 
      ∆𝑞 = 𝜇𝛼∆𝐼 +  1 − 𝜇𝛼 .∆𝐾 + 𝜃, 
Lowercase variables representing logarithms. When returns to scale are constant, the share of 
capital and labor in value added is 1. The margin factor is defined as the ratio of the price of value 
added P to marginal cost (μ = P / Cm) and noting α = WL / PQ, we obtain 
      ∆𝑞 = 𝜇𝛼∆𝐼 +  1 − 𝜇𝛼 .∆𝐾 + 𝜃, 
Subtracting 𝛼(∆𝐼 − ∆𝐾) from both sides of the equation and rearranging yields the Solow residue  
      S𝑅 = ∆𝑞 − 𝛼∆𝐼 −  1 − 𝛼 ∆𝐾 =  𝜇 − 1 . 𝛼 ∆𝐼 − ∆𝐾 + 𝜃 
In a situation of pure and perfect competition (μ = 1), the Solow residual is independent of the 
growth rate of the capital / labor ratio and is equal to the rate of technical progress θ. In reality, this 
property, known as the invariance property of the Solow residue, is not observed. The markup is 
related to the Lerner index denoted B by the expression 𝜇 = 1 (1 − 𝛽) . The Solow residue is 
rewritten:  
  𝑆𝑅 = ∆𝑞 − 𝛼∆𝐼 −  1 − 𝛼 ∆𝐾 = 𝛽.  ∆𝑞 − ∆𝐾 
In pure and perfect competition (B = 0), the Solow residue is equal to the rate of technical 
progress. Roeger (1995) shows that an equivalent expression can be obtained for a Solow residue 
based on the prices  𝑆𝑅𝑃 = 𝛼∆𝑤 +  1 − 𝛼 ∆𝑟 − ∆𝑝 = −𝛽.  ∆𝑝 − ∆𝑟 +  1 − 𝛽 . 𝜃 
   Subtracting SRP from SR and adding an error term yields an expression to estimate B 
   ∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽∆𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, 
where ∆𝑦 =  ∆𝑞 + ∆𝑝 − 𝛼.  ∆𝐼 + ∆𝑤 −  1 − 𝛼 .  ∆𝐾 + ∆𝑟 , 
is the growth rate of nominal Solow residue and 
         ∆𝑥 =  ∆𝑞 + ∆𝑝 −  ∆𝑘 + ∆𝑟 , 
is the growth rate of the nominal production-to-capital ratio. The advantage of this method is that 
prices and volumes can be grouped so that only nominal variables are needed for the estimation. 
   It is possible to extend the approach by incorporating intermediate consumption. In this case, 
the markup is defined as the ratio between the marginal cost and the production price, and no longer 
the price of value added. 
 
Conclusions on the basis of L and the outcome of a profit maximization test4 
Test (H0 : profit max) Value of B Market power present? 
Reject 
Reject 
B > 0 
B ≤ 0 
Yes, but unclear how much 
Unknown, additional information needed 
Fail to reject  B > 0 Yes, and there is more market power the closer B to 1 
Fail to reject  B = 0 
B < 0 
No 
Unlikely to occur because B ϵ[0,1) under profit maximization  
 
Time evolution of the variables of the model 
 
Graph1. Evolution of industrial production 
Source: HCP 
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Graph 2. Evolution of employment by industrial branches 
Source: The Moroccan observatory of industry 
 
 
Graph 3. Payroll 
Source: HCP 
 
 
Graph 4. Intermediate consumption 
Source: HCP 
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Graph 5. Investment 
Source: The Moroccan observatory of industry and the ministry of energy and mines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
Extractive Indu 
Agro Indu 
Chemical and 
parachemical Indu 
Mechanical, metallic 
and electrical Indu
Textile and leather 
Indu
Other manufacturing 
Indu excluding 
refining  
Oil Refining
Investment
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 4(4), S. El Ouahabi, & A. Bousselhami, p.396-407. 
407 
407 
 
References 
Abbad, T. (2017). Accumulation du capital et gains de productivité au Maroc, OCP Policy Center. 
Aghion, P., Bloom, N., Blundell, R., Griffith, R., & Howitt, P. (2005). Competition and innovation: 
An inverted u relationship, Quarterly Journal of Economics. 120(2), 701-728. doi.  
10.1162/0033553053970214 
Baily, M.N., Gordon R.J., & Bresnahan, F.T.  (1993). Competition, regulation and efficiency in 
service industries, Brookings Papers on Econornic Activity: Microeconomics, p.50-71. doi. 
10.2307/2534738 
Bouis, R. (2007). Quels secteurs réformer pour favoriser l’emploi et la croissance, Documents de 
Travail de la DGTPE. 
Bos, J., Kolari, J., & Van Lamoen, R. (2013). Competition and innovation: Evidence from financial 
services, Journal of Banking and Finance, 37(5), 1595-1601. doi. 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.12.015 
El Aoufi, N., & Hollard, M. (2010). Fondements d’une pragmatique de la concurrence au Maroc, 
Note D’orientation, Conseil de la Concurrence. 
Klein, C., & Bouis, R. (2009). Concurrence et gains de productivité: Analyse sectorielle dans les pays 
de l’OCDE, Économie et Prévision, 189, 131-152. doi. 10.3406/ecop.2009.7930 
Klein, C., Bouis, R. (2008). La concurrence favorise-t elle les gains de productivité? Analyse 
sectorielle dans les pays de l’OCDE. Économie et Statistique, 419, 73-99. doi. 
10.3406/estat.2008.7728 
La Direction des études et des prévisions financières (DEPF) (2003), Le secteur de transport des 
marchandises: Contraintes et voies de réformes. 
Loecker, J., & Warzynski, F. (2010). Markups and firm-level export status, American Economic 
Review, 102(6), 2437-2472. doi. 10.1257/aer.102.6.2437 
Martins, J-O., Scarpetta, S., & Pilat, D. (1996). Mark-up ratios in manufacturing industries: Estimates 
for 14 OECD countries, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No.162. doi. 
10.1787/007750682315 
Norrbin, S. (1993). The relation between price and marginal cost in the U.S. industry: A 
contradiction, Journal of Political Economy, 101(6), 1149-1164. doi. 10.1086/261918 
OCDE, (2003). Concurrence sur les marchés de produits et performance économique, Revue de 
l’OCDE sur le Droit et la Politique de la Concurrence, 4(4), 27-38. doi. 10.1787/clp-v4-art14-fr  
Pilat, D. (1996). Concurrence, productivité et efficience, Revue Economique, 27, 124-145. 
Portier, F. (1995). Le rôle des variations de taux de marge dans les fluctuations macroéconomiques 
conjoncturelles, L’actualité Economique, Revue D’analyse Economique, 71(2), 218-249. doi. 
10.7202/602175ar 
Przybyla, M. & Roma, M. (2005). Does product market competition reduce inflation? Evidence from 
countries and sectors. ECB Working Paper, No.453. [Retrieved from]. 
Roeger, W. (1995). Can imperfect competition explain the difference between prima and dual 
productivity measures? Estimates for US manufacturing, Journal of Political Economy, 103(3), 
316-330. doi. 10.1086/261985 
Sembenelli, A., & Siotis, G. (2008). Foreign direct investment and mark-up dynamics: Evidence from 
Spanish firms, Journal of International Economics, 76(1), 107-115. doi.  
10.1016/j.jinteco.2008.05.003 
Siotis, G. (2003). Competitive pressure and economic integration: an illustration for spain, 1983-
1996, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21(10), 1435-1459. doi. 10.1016/s0167-
7187(03)00051-1 
Spierdjik, L., & Zaouras, M (2016). The lerner index and revenue maximization, Applied Economics 
Letters, 24(5), 1075-1079. doi. 10.1080/13504851.2016.1254333 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyrights 
Copyright for this article is retained by the author(s), with first publication rights granted to 
the journal. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the 
Creative Commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0). 
 
